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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathon Hernandez appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty
plea to second-degree murder. Hernandez claims the district court imposed a
sentence "based upon materially false assumptions" and that the sentence
imposed failed to "take into account [his] role in the offense, his age, and the
likelihood of rehabilitation."

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Hernandez for first-degree murder for his
involvement in the murder of Elizabeth Baune, which murder occurred during the
course of a "robbery and/or burglary."

(R. 1 , pp.33-34.)

Elizabeth died from

multiple stab wounds to her chest and head; she was "stabbed a total of 29
times," including four stab wounds that penetrated her skull and two that "went all
the way through her skull." (R., p.33; PSI, p.8.) Elizabeth was left with an eight
inch knife "lodged in her head." (PSI, p.8.) The Indictment also alleged that
Hernandez committed burglary and grand theft by receiving or possessing stolen
property, "to-wit: a financial transaction card issued by U.S. Bank, the property of

There are three Clerk's Records included in the record on appeal. One
includes all documents and is paginated consecutively from 1 to 350. The other
two are designated volumes 1 and 2, with the first volume paginated 1 to 250 and
the second volume is not paginated. The state assumes the duplication is the
result of non-compliance with I.AR. 28(f), which provides, in relevant part, that
"[e]ach volume of the clerk's or agency's record shall contain no more than 200
pages unless the record can be completed in 250 pages." Because neither
version of the Clerk's Record complies with I.AR. 28(f), all references in this brief
will be to the single volume that is completely paginated.
1
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Elizabeth Baune."2 (R., p.34.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hernandez pied guilty to second-degree
murder and the state dismissed the remaining charges. 3 (R., pp.208-220, 226227; Tr., pp.1-14.)
recommendation.

There was no agreement limiting the state's sentencing
(R., p.218.)

After a two-day sentencing hearing, the court

imposed a unified life sentence with 45 years fixed.

(R., pp.326-327.)

Hernandez filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R., pp.333334; Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to reconsider Sentence Pursuant
to I.C.R. 35 ("Rule 35 Order") (augmentation).) Hernandez filed a timely notice of
appeal from the judgment. (Notice of Appeal, filed April 18, 2014.)

2

Hernandez had a co-defendant, Michael Culley, who was also charged with the
same three counts. (See R., p.257 (caption); Register of Actions, State of Idaho
v. Michael Culley, Payette County Case No. CR 2012-2423.
3

The state also agreed to dismiss a battery on a correctional officer charge filed
in a separate case. (R., p.218.)
2

ISSUES
Hernandez states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did imposing sentence based upon materially false assumptions
violate state and federal due process rights? Idaho Const. Art.
I,§ 13; U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14?
2. Was the sentence imposed predicated on sound reasoning and
consistent with the Toohi/1 standards?
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.8.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Hernandez failed to show the district court's sentence was based on
any materially false assumptions or that it was otherwise an abuse of discretion?

3

ARGUMENT
Hernandez Has Failed To Show The District Court Violated His Constitutional
Rights Or Abused Its Discretion In Imposing Sentence

A

Introduction
Hernandez argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to

due process by imposing a sentence that was "based upon materially false
assumptions" and that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-18.)

Both of

Hernandez's arguments fail. Hernandez's constitutional argument fails because
he has not met his burden of showing fundamental error in support of his claim.
Hernandez's excessive sentence claim fails because the district court applied the
relevant legal standards and acted well within its discretion in imposing a unified
life sentence with 45 years fixed for the brutal murder of Elizabeth Baune.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ."

4

~

C.

Hernandez Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing Fundamental
Error In Relation To The Factors The District Court Considered In
Imposing Sentence
It is well-settled that a sentencing court may consider a broad range of

information when fashioning an appropriate sentence. Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949); State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17, 454 P.2d 51, 54 (1969); State
v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App. 2000). A defendant is
denied due process when the sentencing court relies upon information that is
materially untrue or when the court makes materially false assumptions of fact.
Dunn, 134 Idaho at 172, 997 P.2d at 633; State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495,
681 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1984). To minimize the likelihood of such due process
violations, the reliability of the information upon which the court relies must
ordinarily be insured by the defendant's opportunity to present favorable
evidence, to examine all the materials and to explain or rebut adverse evidence.
Moore, 93 Idaho at 17, 454 P.2d at 54; State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 854
P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1993). As recognized by Idaho's appellate courts, however,
due process does not require sentencing courts to disregard their own
knowledge and experiences in fashioning appropriate sentences.

State v.

Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 320-21, 563 P.2d 42, 44-45 (1977); Gibson, 106 Idaho at
495, 681 P.2d at 5. As explained by the Court in Wallace:
Officers of our judicial system are not monks living in cells, but
rather people living in society with the ability to see and hear.
Insofar as the criminal justice system is concerned, a trial judge sits
at the juncture of the law enforcement and the judicial systems. To
say that a judge may not utilize knowledge gained from his official
position ... would require him to close his eyes and ears to the real
world.
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Wallace, 98 Idaho at 320-21, 563 P.2d at 44-45, quoted in Gibson, 106 Idaho at
495, 681 P.2d at 5. See also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) ("Any
sentencing decision calls for the exercise of judgment. It is neither possible nor
desirable for a person to whom the state entrusts an important judgment to
decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences."). As long as the information is
not materially untrue, a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion or deprive
a defendant of due process by "utiliz[ing] knowledge gained from his own official
position and his own observations" in determining an appropriate sentence.
Gibson, 106 Idaho at 495, 681 P.2d at 5 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949)).
Hernandez argues that the district court's sentence, and subsequent
denial of his Rule 35 motion, was "based upon the materially false assumption[s]"
that (1) Hernandez "was the person who stabbed [Elizabeth], indeed the person
who inflicted the final fatal stab wound;" (2) "rehabilitative services are not
available in prison;" (3) Hernandez "would not acquire any work skills in prison;"
and (4) Hernandez "would continue to be a danger to society" and "the danger to
society would lessen with age, but not sufficiently for purposes of public safety,
until [he] is 65 years old." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Hernandez acknowledges that
he did not raise any of the foregoing objections to the trial court and, as such, he
must demonstrate the court's alleged consideration

of "materially false

assumptions" resulted in fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, p.8 (citing State v.
Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 88, 253 P.3d 754, 762 (Ct. App. 2011) (applying
fundamental error to claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that district court

6

violated due process by considering certain information at sentencing).) To show
fundamental error, Hernandez must satisfy the test articulated by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). Under
Perry, unobjected to claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part
test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).
Hernandez cannot satisfy the first step of the fundamental error analysis
because, contrary to his assertions, the district court did not make any "materially
false assumption[s]" in imposing sentence.

Hernandez first argues that the

"sentence was imposed based upon the materially false assumption that [he] was
the person who stabbed Ms. Baune, indeed the person who inflicted the final
fatal stab wound." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) This assertion is itself a misstatement
as nowhere in the court's comments imposing sentence did it state that
Hernandez "was the person who stabbed Ms. Baune." (See generally Sent. Tr.,
pp.191-199.)

Hernandez recognizes this later in his argument when he notes

that it was not until the court entered its order denying his Rule 35 motion that he
"learned that the court mistakenly believed that he had stabbed Ms. Baune and
indeed had inflicted the final fatal wound." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Relying on
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State v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 712 P.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1985), Hernandez
appears to argue that he was denied due process because he did not have an
opportunity to respond to this "mistaken[ ]" belief. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) This
argument

ignores

the

reality

that

Hernandez

could

have

requested

reconsideration by the court on this basis but he did not, which is precisely why
he must show fundamental error. Hernandez cannot meet his burden of showing
fundamental error because the record shows that the court's statement was not
materially false.
In analyzing this issue, this Court should begin with Hernandez's guilty
plea. Count I of the Amended Indictment to which Hernandez pied guilty alleged:
That the Defendant, JONATHON HERNANDEZ on or about the 7th
day of November, 2012, in the County of Payette, State of Idaho,
willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but
without premeditation, [did] kill and murder Elizabeth Baune, a
human being [by] stabbing Elizabeth Baune multiple times in the
chest and head with a knife, and/or inflicting wounds from which
she died which is a violation of I.C. 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-4003
- MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE (FELONY).
(R., p.205 (capitalization original, bold omitted); 8/29/2013 Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2,
L.16 (discussing amendments to charging language).)
During the plea colloquy, the court read the foregoing language to
Hernandez and asked if he pied guilty to that charge. (8/29/2013 Tr., p.10, L.23
- p.11, L.9.)

Hernandez answered:

"Yes."

(8/29/2013 Tr., p.11, L.10.) The

following exchange then occurred:
THE COURT: And tell the court what you did to be guilty of that
offense.
[HERNANDEZ]: Yes.
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THE COURT: What the court needs to do is to understand that, in
fact, you're guilty. And the reason the court needs to do that is that
we have to make sure that indeed there are facts that support this
guilty plea.
So can you tell the court or describe for the court the facts
that make you guilty of this offense.
[HERNANDEZ]: On the night of November 7th I was with Mike
Culley, and he asked me to go to his house with him to get some
clothes and some credit cards, and I agreed. So we walked out to
the home of Elizabeth Baune. He was in there for a little bit. I was
outside smoking a cigarette. I didn't hear no screams or anything,
but when I went inside Mike -- I leaned over to see if she was dead,
and I was pretty sure she was dead. And I ended up taking her car.
I drove Mike away. I used her credit card knowing she was dead. I
took money from her bank account, and then I proceeded to buy
methamphetamine with it, and I threw away my clothes. That's it.
THE COURT: Well, the accusation here which you pied guilty to
accuses you of stabbing Ms. Baune multiple times in the chest and
head with a knife and/or inflicting wounds from which she died.
Were you a participant in that act?
(Off the record.)
[HERNANDEZ]: Well, I didn't stab her, but when I went to pick her
up I could have inflicted wounds there.
THE COURT: Like what?
[HERNANDEZ]: I don't know. She had an abrasion on her left
shoulder. There's bruising there. She was bleeding.
THE COURT: So do you believe that you inflicted the wounds from
which she died?
[HERNANDEZ]: Yes.
THE COURT: Is there any question in your mind?
[HERNANDEZ]: No.
(8/29/2013 Tr., p.11, L.11 - p.13, L.2.)

9

When the court asked defense counsel if she believed there was a factual
basis to accept Hernandez's guilty plea to second-degree murder, counsel
responded:
Your Honor, we discussed this yesterday by phone, the
prosecutor and myself, and discussed doing kind of like an
accessory after the fact or aid and abet or something like that, but it
doesn't really fit in the parameters that we wanted this in. And
there is a factual basis.
There's footprints where she was located belonging to my
client. There's a weapon there which could have been used by
somebody to inflict her wounds. And certainly when he reached
down and touched her and grabbed her and kind of rolled her over,
it could have very much precipitated her death at that time. So I
believe there is a factual basis.
(8/29/2013 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-17.)
The prosecutor agreed there was a factual basis, adding that "there were
other witnesses and people who have given information regarding the crime that
would support the fact that he inflicted wounds which caused her death."
(8/29/2013 Tr., p.13, Ls.18-23.) The court invited Hernandez to add "anything
further," but Hernandez declined. (8/29/2013 Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.3.) The
court then clarified, with Hernandez, that he deliberately "inflicted the wounds
from which [Elizabeth] died," and Hernandez agreed that he did. (8/29/2013 Tr.,
p.14, Ls.9-15.)
While Hernandez claimed he did not stab Elizabeth, he clearly admitted
that he deliberately "inflicted
(8/29/2013 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-15.)

the wounds from which

[Elizabeth] died."

Given that the autopsy report, attached to the

PSI, reflects that the cause of Elizabeth's death was "multiple stab wounds of the
head, neck and chest" (Autopsy Report, p.3), and given Hernandez's admission
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that he, in fact, inflicted fatal wounds, Hernandez's insistence that he did not stab
Elizabeth seems to be a matter of word games. In any event, the district court's
overall statement in its order denying Hernandez's Rule 35 motion, that
Hernandez "admitted stabbing Elizabeth Baune and that the wound he inflicted
could have been the death blow suffered" (Rule 35 Order, p.4), hardly constitutes
a materially false statement, much less one that violated Hernandez's due
process rights.
Hernandez also claims that the "state never presented any evidence [that
Hernandez stabbed Elizabeth] and [he] and Mr. Culley consistently denied this."
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

This is incorrect.

As noted, Hernandez specifically

admitted he deliberately inflicted wounds that caused Elizabeth's death, which
death was caused by stab wounds, even though Hernandez was not willing to
say his actions actually constituted stabbing. Further, Culley did not consistently
deny that both he and Hernandez stabbed Elizabeth.

During one interview,

Culley told Trooper Jess Stennett that Hernandez stabbed Elizabeth "multiple
times and then handed Culley the knife" at which time Culley also stabbed
Elizabeth "multiple times." (Idaho State Police Incident Report by Trooper Jess
Stennett, #M12000193, p.5 of 9, attached to PSI.) In addition, the PSI included
information that a "source of information" who was housed with Hernandez
relayed that Hernandez confided in him that he and Culley "stabbed [Eliazbeth]
multiple times and after they finished stabbing [her], Culley stabbed her in the
head and left the knife in her head before leaving the house."

(PSI, p.8.)

Although Culley's defense counsel objected to the prosecutor including this
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information in her sentencing argument because the name and motivation of the
informant was "unknown," the court was entitled to consider it and give the
evidence "the weight that [it] believe[d] it deserve[d]." (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-20.) The
court correctly recognized the limitations on considering the statements of the
informant, but was entitled to consider Hernandez's admissions to others that he
stabbed Elizabeth, particularly to the extent the statements attributed to
Hernandez were corroborated by other evidence. As explained in Reid:
The credibility of jailhouse informants, particularly those who
are not subject to cross-examination, is a serious issue, although
more so at trial than sentencing. The district court recognized that
[the informant's] credibility and the reliability of his story was an
issue. The district court determined that although it could not
assess [the informant's] credibility in general, the similarity of facts
recounted by [the informant] and facts adduced months later at trial
gave credibility to the information. In addition, the district court
expressed appropriate caution in the usefulness of the information.
While there were inconsistencies, Reid has not proven that the
information was materially untrue such as to rise to the level of a
due process violation. Thus, Reid has not demonstrated error.
151 Idaho at 90, 253 P.3d at 764.
As in Reid, Hernandez's claim that the district court's sentence was based
upon a materially false assumption that Hernandez "admitted stabbing Elizabeth
Baune and that the wound he inflicted could have been the death blow suffered"
(Rule 35 Order, p.4) is without merit and Hernandez has failed to show a
constitutional due process violation under the first prong of Perry based on the
court's statement related to whether Hernandez stabbed Elizabeth.
Hernandez's other "materially false assumption" arguments suffer a similar
fate in that they also fail to show a due process violation. The arguments also
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misconstrue the court's statements and rely on evidence that is not in the record
and was never presented to the district court for consideration.
At sentencing, the district court's comments included the following:
In this case I find that a fixed term exceeding 25 years is
warranted for the following reason or reasons. It's highly unlikely
that either defendant will receive the intensive rehabilitative
treatment that's outlined by the psychologists that interviewed
them, and it's certainly unlikely that it will happen in a prison setting.
After a lengthy period of incarceration there is little realistic
ability for these defendants with no work skills to be productive
members of the community. The vast majority of the evidence
presented to this court supports the conclusion that these
defendants will continue to be a high risk of danger to the public.
Now, there is no magical formula that can be used to
evaluate when a person might no longer be a risk to the
community. When asked that question this morning, Dr. Cervantes
really did never answer it. But I think common sense prevails. It
certainly would lead one to conclude that the risk of danger to the
community diminishes with age such that a man of old age is not
the same risk for violence as a man of younger years.
In my mind neither man in this case should be released any
earlier than reaching the age of 65, and that may be too early. But
as [defense counsel] points out, the parole board is perfectly
capable of evaluating the risk of danger to the public at that point.
(Sent. Tr., p.197, L.24 - p.199, L.1.)
From the foregoing comments, Hernandez constructs the argument4 that:
As in Morgan, Mr. Hernandez only learned of the judge's materially
false assumptions at the time sentence was imposed - only as the
court pronounced sentence did Mr. Hernandez and his counsel
learn that the judge believed that appropriate rehabilitative services
were not available at the prison; that work skills training is not

The state assumes these are the comments that form the basis of Hernandez's
argument because, although Hernandez fails to provide any citations for the
"materially false assumptions" he complains about in the argument section of his
brief (Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 11 ), he does cite the excerpt included above in his
Procedural History and Statement of Facts (Appellant's Brief, p.7).
4
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available at the prison; and that men do not age out of violent
behavior until they are in their mid-sixties.
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
Once again, Hernandez's reliance on Morgan is misplaced.

In Morgan,

the court commented at sentencing that the defendant "violated a condition of his
bond, causing his wife to be hospitalized." 109 Idaho at 1042, 712 P.2d at 743.
This assertion "was not based upon any report in the record" but was "apparently
an oral statement from an unidentified source" of which "Morgan and his attorney
were unaware."

kl

Morgan appealed the sentence and filed a Rule 35 motion,

arguing that "the judge had been misinformed."

kl

In support of his motion,

Morgan "presented a letter from his wife to the judge, stating that it was not
Morgan, but a former husband, who had physically abused her on the occasion
in question."

kl

The judge, however, did not hold a hearing on the Rule 35

motion or make any findings, but instead "wrote 'motion denied' at the bottom of
the motion itself."

kl

The Court of Appeals concluded that the judge's action

deprived Morgan of procedural due process because it denied him a "full
opportunity to explain and rebut adverse evidence."

kl

Hernandez notes that he, like Morgan, filed a Rule 35 motion, but he does
not acknowledge that he made no effort to identify or correct any allegedly
materially false assumption made by the district court at sentencing. (Appellant's
Brief, p.11.) Instead, the grounds for Hernandez's Rule 35 motion were stated as
follows:
1.
That the Defendant wishes to address the Court regarding
the sentence currently imposed in this case, in the nature of a
plea for leniency.
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2.
That the Defendant is working on rehabilitation and
schooling and requests that the Court suspend part of the
execution of his fixed sentence.
3.
That the Defendant requests this court to allow him to
supplement the record and amend this motion as more information
is obtained by Defendant.
4.
That the court consider testimony by Dr. Beaver, Dr.
Cervantes and Dr. Sombke regarding rehabilitation of Defendant.
5.
That the court reduce the sentence or resentence Defendant
due to court's [sic] failure to notify Defendant of Appeal, Rule 35,
PCR time limits and need for DNA and right thumb print.
(R., p.334 (emphasis added).)

Although Hernandez requested oral argument on his Rule 35 motion, it
appears he never made any effort to schedule a hearing, nor did he ever
"supplement the record and amend th[e] motion" with "more information." (R.,
p.334.) As noted by the district court when it eventually denied the motion:
In this case, four months have passed since the defendant filed his
Rule 35 request. Since that time, nothing has been filed to
supplement or amend the defendant's original Rule 35 motion.
Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that neither additional
testimony nor oral argument would be of assistance to the Court in
this case.
(Rule 35 Order, p.2.)
Any claim that Hernandez was denied due process, i.e., notice and an
opportunity to respond to the court's allegedly material false assumptions is
without merit. Additionally, as revealed by the court's comments set forth above
and

Hernandez's argument,

Hernandez's characterization

of the court's

statements as materially false assumptions does not withstand scrutiny.

First,

according to Hernandez, the court's statement that "appropriate rehabilitative
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programs are not available in the prisons" is incorrect because appellate counsel
has determined from the Idaho Department of Correction's website that
"education and treatment at the prisons [is] based upon research and best
practices," offender assessments are "used to format a rehabilitation program to
address each offender's identified risks and needs," and there are programs and
services available to address "cognitive/behavioral; mental health; substance
abuse; education and vocation education; family reunification; and aftercare."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Besides the fact that Hernandez's argument is based
on information that should not be considered because it was not presented to the
district court and is not included in the record, the argument ignores what the
district court actually said, which is that it was "unlikely" that Hernandez would
"receive the intensive rehabilitative treatment that's outlined by the psychologists
that interviewed them, and it's certainly unlikely that it will happen in a prison
setting."

(Sent. Tr., p.198, Ls.1-5.)

Appellate counsel's speculation that

information from the Department's website contradicts the concerns expressed
by the district court does not demonstrate that the court made any materially
false assumption in this regard.

Indeed, this Court can surely have some

confidence that a district judge, based on knowledge gained from his official
position, has sufficient familiarity with rehabilitative options available to certain
offenders while incarcerated. Wallace, supra.
Hernandez's claim that the court made a "materially false assumption" that
"work skills training is not available at the prison" (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ), also
misrepresents the court's statement and is based on appellate counsel's review
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of information from the Department of Correction's website, not evidence in the
record or presented to the district court. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) The district
court's comment was that "After a lengthy period of incarceration there is little
realistic ability for these defendants with no work skills to be productive members
of the community."

(Sent. Tr., p.198, Ls.6-9.)

The judge did not say that

Hernandez could not acquire any work skills while in prison.

He said that

Hernandez had no work skills, which was a true statement. As noted in the PSI,
Hernandez, who was 19 years old, had no employment history and no "job skills
and/or experience." (PSI, p.17.) Nor did Hernandez ever express any desire to
acquire any skills. His stated goals were to become "a better citizen" and "get
more healthy," nothing he had "lost 15 pounds since working out." (PSI, p.20.)
Further, even assuming consideration of information gleaned from the
Department of Correction's website is appropriate for purposes of trying to show
the district court made "materially false assumptions," nothing in appellate
counsel's research of the website supports any conclusion that Hernandez would
be willing or able to participate in any of the work programs listed on the website.
For example, that "Correctional Industries employs more that [sic] 400 inmates in
trades such as furniture-making, upholstery, printing, sign shop, and metal shop"
and the fact that "last year 114 inmates completed" the horticulture program
demonstrates only that Idaho Correctional Industries employs some of its
inmates and that a fraction of the Department's inmate population 5 can
participate in the horticulture program. There is no evidence, either in the record

Idaho's inmate population at the end of FY14 was 8, 120.
http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/document/brief_sheet_september_2014
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or in Hernandez's brief, that would support a finding that Hernandez could benefit
from any of the training or employment opportunities he identifies in his brief.
Hernandez's final contention regarding the district court's allegedly
materially false assumptions involves the court's comments about the risk
Hernandez presents and at what age that risk may be sufficiently diminished to
safely consider releasing Hernandez from incarceration. Specifically, Hernandez
expresses his agreement with the court that "men tend to be less likely to engage
in violence as they age," but complains that "there is no scientific evidence that
this tendency does not develop until men are in their mid-sixties." (Appellant's
Brief, p.12.) 'To the contrary," Hernandez argues, "it appears this occurs in a
man's mid forties" because there is an article in the Journal of Criminal Justice
that he contends says as much. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Of course, as with
most of Hernandez's arguments, he did not present any information or evidence
to the district court on this point. Regardless, the district court did not purport to
rely on any scientific evidence that 65 is the magical age of risk diminishment.
What the court did rely on was the evidence that was presented and Hernandez's
expert's inability to answer "when a person might no longer be a risk to the
community." (Sent. Tr., p.198, Ls.13-16.) As a result, the court employed the
"common sense" principle with which Hernandez agrees - that risk diminishes
with age - and cited its reasons for concluding that Hernandez should not be
released "any earlier than reaching the age of 65." (Sent. Tr., p.198, Ls.17-23.)
As cogently noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Windom, 150 Idaho
873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011):
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Sentencing is less a science than an art. Judges face a
different uncertainty principle than physicists: they must make a
factual finding of the probability of future criminal behavior based
upon limited data. In so doing, they draw upon their accumulated
experience. It is precisely because of the difficulty of fashioning an
objectively appropriate sentence that this Court has adopted a
deferential standard of review of sentencing decisions.
The district court's comments about the risk Hernandez poses and the
appropriate fixed term given the information and evidence available to the court
do not reflect materially false assumptions.
Because Hernandez has failed to meet his burden of showing any due
process violations under the first prong of Perry, this Court need not consider the
remaining prongs. Even if considered, this Court can conclude Hernandez has
not met his burden of showing plain error or that the outcome would have been
different had Hernandez provided any additional evidence (assuming such
evidence exists) regarding his involvement in Elizabeth's murder, his ability to
work, or his rehabilitative prospects.
Regarding

plain

error,

Hernandez contends

"there

could

be

no

conceivable strategic reason for counsel not to have objected to this error had
the opportunity presented itself."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

Of course, the

opportunity did present itself as is apparent from the fact that counsel was there
when the court supposedly made the materially false assumptions and the fact
that counsel could and did file a Rule 35 motion.

However, the main flaw in

Hernandez's plain error argument is that he has failed to establish there was any
basis for an objection since his claims regarding material falsity are predicated
entirely on speculation based on reviewing websites and a journal article.
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Moreover, it was well within trial counsel's tactical wheelhouse not to object if
there was nothing to be gained by such an objection. Hernandez's and Culley's
brutal murder of Elizabeth Baune warranted the sentence the court imposed. It
was not objectively unreasonable for counsel to decide not to challenge the
court's choice of words in articulating its sentencing rationale. And, because the
sentence was justified, Hernandez cannot meet his burden of showing that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. It is abundantly clear that
the court was thoughtful in its sentencing decision and considered all of the
information presented to it along with the objectives of sentencing. (See Sent.
Tr., p.191, Ls.9-12 ("Deciding the appropriate sentence in cases like these is not
easy for any human being to do. It's among the most difficult things a judge has
to encounter.") p.192, Ls.9-12 ("I have made a tremendous amount of effort and
given a tremendous amount of thought as to what is the justice in this situation,
and I just hope that, indeed, justice is served."); p.193, L.18- p.195, L.20 (listing
and discussing objectives of sentencing).)
Nevertheless, Hernandez claims a "resentencing is required" because, as
in Morgan, the "judge's careful explanation of the assumptions underlying the
sentence imposed prevents the conclusion that it is plain that the same result
would have been obtained if the sentence had not been based upon multiple
false assumptions" and because a "lesser sentence would not represent an
abuse of discretion."

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

Hernandez's argument

presupposes the court's assumptions were "materially false" even though he has
presented nothing but speculation that that is true.
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The Court in Morgan

remanded for resentencing because the defendant presented information to the
district court that contradicted a finding the court made in imposing sentence,
which the district court never addressed; something Hernandez never did.
Moreover, the Court in Morgan found a remand was required because the
"judge's reasoning [was) obscure," 109 Idaho at 1044, 712 P.2d at 745, which
cannot be said in this case. Most importantly, however, the analytical framework
applied in Morgan pre-dates Perry, so any claim by Hernandez that Morgan
controls rather than Perry is incorrect. (See Appellant's Brief, p.14 ("Even if this
Court determines that it must find that the error affected the outcome, Perry,
supra, remand for resentencing is required.").)

Discussing the third prong of Perry, Hernandez persists that "remand for
resentencing is required" because "the sentence imposed in this case is much
greater than sentences imposed in general in second degree murder cases."
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Comparative sentencing is not the standard generally,
nor is it the relevant legal inquiry under the third prong of Perry. Perry, 150 Idaho
at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (under third prong, "the defendant must demonstrate that
the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances)
that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings"); State v.
Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 183, 857 P.2d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations
omitted) ("It is well settled that not every offense in like category calls for identical
punishment; there may properly be a variation in sentences between different
offenders, depending on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the
defendant in his or her individual case."). In this case, the district court explained
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precisely why it decided to impose a sentence "greater than sentences imposed
in general in second degree murder cases." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Although
Hernandez has attempted to characterize those reasons as "materially false
assumptions," he has been unsuccessful in that endeavor. Given the heinous
nature of the crime and Hernandez's character and attitude, even if Hernandez
takes advantage of any rehabilitative opportunities or skills training while
incarcerated, he is a dangerous individual who poses a high risk to the
community, and the punishment imposed was appropriate and within the limits
authorized by law. And, to the extent this Court is willing to accept Hernandez's
invitation to compare his sentence with sentences in other second-degree
murder cases, this Court should review the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in
Windom. Windom murdered his mother, Judith, by beating her in the face with a
club, and stabbing her repeatedly in the throat, chest, and abdomen. Windom,
150 Idaho at 87 4, 253 P3d at 311.

"Eventually convinced Judith was dead,

Windom removed his hand from what he 'thought was her mouth,' and thrust [a]
knife into her exposed brain."
second-degree murder.

kl

kl at 875,

Windom, like Hernandez, pied guilty to

253 P.3d at 312. The district court imposed a

fixed life sentence on Windom, which the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.

kl

Elizabeth's murder was no less brutal than Judith Windom's, but despite the
state's request that Hernandez receive the same penalty (Sent. Tr., p.166, Ls.911 ), the district court gave Hernandez the opportunity to eventually be paroled.
Hernandez has shown no reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have
been different had he presented his appellate arguments to the district court.
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Hernandez has failed to meet his burden of showing fundamental error in
the district court's sentencing rationale.

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
Hernandez alternatively claims that the district court abused its discretion

by imposing what he believes is an excessive sentence.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.15-18.) This argument is based on the same assertions Hernandez offers in
support of his constitutional claim - that the court based its sentence on "false
assumptions."

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

For the reasons already stated, this

claim fails.
The other argument Hernandez offers in support of his abuse of discretion
claim is based on the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho
820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008). (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) In Izaguirre,
the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and the district court
imposed a life sentence with 60 years fixed. 145 Idaho at 821, 186 P.3d at 677.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals first found error in the district court's failure to
order a neuropsychological evaluation, concluding that the evaluation
would likely provide insights that would aid the sentencing court in
understanding possible causes of [lzaguirre's] behavior, the
prospects for helpful treatment, and his risk of future violence as
they may bear upon his culpability, his potential for rehabilitation,
and the duration of sentence that is necessary for retribution,
deterrence, and the protection of society.

kl at 823,

186 P.3d at 679.

Next, the Court of Appeals cited "[o]ther factors" that led it to "conclude
that lzaguirre's sentence must be reconsidered."
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Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824,

186 P.3d at 680.

Those factors included "the district court's unwillingness to

consider the articles from professional journals on brain development that were
submitted by Izaguirre in support of his Rule 35 motion."

&

In the Court of

Appeals' view, the refusal to consider this information was an abuse of discretion.

&

The Court also concluded the district court's reasons for imposing a sentence

that was "more than twice the joint recommendation of the prosecutor and the
defense" were not "well grounded."

&

Specifically, the Court disagreed with the

district court's comment that a 25-year fixed sentence was "too little" for murder,
finding such a statement "inconsistent with Idaho law."

&

In support, the Court

cited several cases where the court imposed "determinate terms" of 25 years "or
less" for murder.

&

Finally, the Court of Appeals considered the district court's

rationale for rejecting a fixed life sentence, which was that Izaguirre needed an
incentive to "behave" so that he could be parole eligible when he turned 80 years
old.

&

In the Court of Appeals' "view, the notion that there is a significant

difference between a sixty-year fixed term and a fixed life term, or that the
prospect of parole at age eighty would give a twenty-year-old offender more
incentive to behave throughout his term of imprisonment than would a fixed life
sentence, bears little basis in reality."

&

In Hernandez's case, the district court expressly considered Izaguirre
before imposing sentence. At sentencing, the district court said it did not "take
lightly the words of Judge Lansing," who authored Izaguirre, "when she sa[id] the
cases that she listed in her opinion strongly suggest that a standard requiring a
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determinate sentence of more than 25 years for all murder cases is out of step
with judicial norms." (Sent. Tr. p.197, Ls.7-12.) The court continued:
Nevertheless, I looked at at least half of those cases in
which it was 25 years fixed or less. We were looking at defendants
who were much older than these defendants, and the judge
considering the protection of the community imposed a fixed
sentence that would have them serve time well into their 60s.
A careful review of Judge Lansing's words in that case
reflects that she was mindful that in some murder cases a fixed
term exceeding 25 years is appropriate. And counsel has cited and
referred to occasions when it has been appropriate.
(Sent. Tr., p.197, Ls.13-23.)
The court then explained why it believed a "fixed term exceeding 25 years
is warranted" in Hernandez's case, listing those factors Hernandez claims are
"materially false assumptions." (Sent. Tr., p.197, L.24 - p.199, L.6.) The court
reiterated its consideration of Judge Lansing's opinion in Izaguirre when it denied
Hernandez's Rule 35 motion. (Rule 35 Order, p.5.) Also included in the order
denying Hernandez's Rule 35 motion was the following statement:
The Court gave consideration to the management issue for the
prison system and concluded that a sentence of fixed life gave no
incentive to this defendant to behave or attempt rehabilitative
treatment when there is no hope for release. Thus, a sentence of
fixed life was rejected by the Court.
(Rule 35 Order, p.5 (emphasis added).)
Hernandez, referring back to Izaguirre, contends that "[j]ust as there is
little basis in reality to believe that a 20-year-old can be inspired to behave
himself in prison for the next 60 years in order to have a chance of parole at age
80, there is little basis in reality to believe that a 20-year-old will be inspired to
behave because that chance of parole will come at age 65." (Appellant's Brief,
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p.17.) According to Hernandez, for a "20-year-old, 65 is nearly as unimaginable
as 80" and
even if a 20-year-old could visualize himself as a 65-year-old and
plan to make parole at that time, he would likely reason that he
could be fairly bad between now and his 50 th birthday, then put in
15 excellent years and have as much chance for parole as he
would have had if he behaved excellently for the full fixed term.
(Appellant's Brief, p.17.)
Whatever behavioral choices Hernandez may elect to make based on his
parole eligibility date are ultimately irrelevant to whether the district court
exercised reason in imposing a fixed 45-year term. Further, even assuming this
Court would agree that there is no "significant difference between a [45] year
fixed term and a fixed life term," just as the Court of Appeals found no "significant
difference between a sixty-year fixed term and a fixed life term," in terms of
behavioral incentives, Izaguirre, supra, this is an insufficient basis to vacate the
district court's sentence. It is apparent that this single criticism was not the basis
for the Court of Appeals' decision to vacate the sentence in Izaguirre. Moreover,
to reverse the district court's sentence for this reason would ignore the Idaho
Supreme Court's statement in Windom that the applicable standard of review for
sentencing decisions "does not require (nor indeed, does it permit), [this Court] to
conduct [its] own evaluation of the weight to be given each of the sentencing
considerations (societal protection, general and specific deterrence, defendant's
prospects for rehabilitation and societal retribution) in order to determine whether
[this Court] agree[s] with the district court's conclusion." Windom, 150 Idaho at
881, 253 P.3d at 318.
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"[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial
court will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court
for its own."

~

at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted). In order to prevail on

his claim that the district court abused its discretion, Hernandez must show his
"sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."
~

at 876, 253 P.3d at 313. "The primary consideration is, and presumptively

always will be, the good order and protection of society. All other factors are,
and must be, subservient to that end." State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 705, 316
P.3d 109,117 (Ct. App. 2013).
That Hernandez disagrees with how the district court weighed the
evidence and balanced the objectives of sentencing does not show an abuse of
discretion. Hernandez committed a heinous crime and he continued to engage in
violent, disruptive, and abusive behavior after he was arrested and incarcerated.
(PSI, pp.13-14.) Neither his age nor his rehabilitative potential (Appellant's Brief,
p.18), warranted a lesser sentence.

Based on the nature of the offense,

Hernandez's character, and the objectives of sentencing, a unified life sentence
with 45 years fixed is not excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence entered upon Hernandez's guilty plea to the brutal second-degree
murder of Elizabeth Baune.
DATED this 31 st day of December 2014.
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